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THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF MEMBERS OF
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION.
When the result of the presidential election of r84o,
the triumph of "Tippecanoe and Tyler Too," became
known there was much rejoicing in Pittsburgh and
Allegheny. During the progress of that emotional
campaign, the Whigs had used the public house of John
Irons for meetings and rendezvous, to the grievous
deterioration of his carpets and furniture. At a large
and enthusiastic meeting-what would now be called
a ratification meeting-of supporters of the victorious
ticket it was proposed, with a view to compensating
Mr. Irons, that a great free dinner should be gotten up,
the expense to be defrayed by voluntary subscriptions.
The dinner was to be prepared by Mr. Irons. The occa-
sion was to be his "benefit." A committee of the sug-
gestive number of thirteen was appointed to arrange
the details, and another similar one to invite the guests.
William Eichbaum, John D. Davis, William Black and
William D. Darlington were members of one or the
other of these committees. Together on the following
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day they met "a concourse of people of the same pelit-
ical stamp," who organized as an original meeting,
with Mr. Eichbaum in the chair, and again went over
the whole project. Mr. Eichbaum and Mr. Davis, pos-
sibly with a presentiment of what was in store for them,
opposed it by argument and vote, but eventually
yielded to the majority resolved upon a free dinner.
At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Irons was called
before the committees and in the presence of and with-
out dissent from the gentlemen named was directed to
prepare a dinner for iooo persons and serve it at Taaffe's
warehouse. Then the work of collecting subscriptions
was taken in hand by another committee appointed at
the last meeting. As the days fled by the partisan
character of the enterprise vanished in universal good
feeling and pleasurable anticipation. Its popularity
so grew that at the time and place appointed for the
dinner 4000 people of all political parties "partook of
it with wonderful cordiality." In the meanwhile the
response to requests for subscriptions seems not to
have been nearly so spirited as the response to the invi-
tations to dine free of charge. The outcome was a
deficit likely to turn John Irons's intended benefit into
a woful disaster. But John Irons--nomen, omen-was
not made of the stuff to submit without a struggle.
He promptly sued William Eichbaum and the other
gentlemen named in assumpsit and recovered. On writ
of error the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Gibson deliv-
ering its opinion, affirmed the judgment against them.'
The plaintiffs in error contended that they were acting
as agents of the meeting that had determined upon the
dinner and appointed the committees, and that upon
that meeting as their principal rested the responsibility
for John Irons's demand. But it was considered that
they had no principal, because there was back of thenm
no definite organization formed for continued eds-
tence-merely- an ephemeral gathering whose con-
stituency at its adjournment was "lost in the'crowd,"
SEichbaum v. Irons. 6 W. & S. 67.
338
MEMBERS OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION.
and that there was no such thing as "responsibility of a
populace." The law of partnership was declared to
have nothing to do with the case. The decision was
predicated upon the existence of a direct contract
between the, plaintiffs and defendant in error, the former
being present and acquiescing when the latter was
given the order. If Messrs. Eichbaum et aL. failed to
accept the issue "with good opinion of the law," they
at least had the comfort of being able to trace it to a
tangible, external and undeniable fact made decisive by
the operation of a principle in its statement and appli-
cation simplicity itself.
In most cases, where a liability is attempted to be fixed
upon members of a committee, a club, or any voluntary
associations by reason of the act, contract or expenditures
of some of them, or of their chosen officers, the question
does not admit of so plainly intelligible a solution.
And though a good deal has been adjudicated on this
subject and the practical outcome of the decisions
seems in the main to be fairly consistent, there has been
such a measure- of divergence in the reasoning by which
they were reached that pretty much every new case
reopens the controversy along the whole line. As lately
as Pain v Sam ple,2 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
was called upon to discuss the question whether mem-
bers of a committee of a voluntary beneficial associa-
tion, having in charge a series of entertainments for
its benefit, were liable as partners upon a contract
made for the purpose stated. Like inquiries are being
continually pressed upon the nisi prius courts. For the
most part they arise between members of committees,
associations, etc., on the one side and outsiders. But
every now and then they arise among the members
themselves, some of them asserting a right of contri-
bution, accounting, etc., against the remainder. It is a
familiar rule that one may hold others as though they
were partners who are not in fact partners, if he can
show that they held themselves out to him and he
2 158 Pa. 42&
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dealt with them as such.3 But when it comes to one
man's holding another as his partner, it must be remem-
bered that a partnership is founded in the voluntary
contract of the parties as distinguished from a mere
community of interest which by operation of law may
arise in various ways.4 In other words, the partnership
relation is one resulting from agreement, express or im-
plied,-from the act and intent of the part es, not from
operation of law contrary to their intent.s Of course
that imposes upon him who asserts the existence of that
relation between himself and another the burden of
establishing it as a fact. Nor in so doing can he avail
himself of circumstances which, as between outsiders
and those whom he seeks to hold as partners with him-
self, might require them to be visited with liabilities
incident to a partnership. No man can in his own
name and for his own benefit set up rights of another
that have not passed to him.6
One thing is clear,-that if persons associated together
as a committee, or a club, or a voluntary association
of any description, are inter se partners, they are
liable as such to one another and also to outsiders. In
Thomas v Ellmaker7 Judge King lays down the rule, in
substance, that a voluntary association for private or
individual profit or pleasure, emolument or benevo-
lence is a partnership, but that members of an associa-
tion for objects of a public nature are not partners inter
se, whatever may be their relation as regards outsiders.
The first part of this proposition he bases upon the old
English chancery rulings and the decision in Babb v
Reed,8 which he says was produced by the same prin-
ciples, and which indeed professes to adopt them. • But
in a large measure those principles were long ago aban-
s Denithorne v. Hook, z2 Pa. 240, 243.
4 Hedge & Horn's App., 63 Pa. 270, 278.
s Gibbs's Est., I57 Pa. 59, 70.
6 See Sparhawk v. Ry. Co., 4 Pa. 401, 421; HilU v. Mut. Protect. Co.,
59. id. 474, 477; Daliry v. Electric, etc., Co., 208 id. 403. 4t2.
7 Pars. Eq. (Pa.) 98.
a5 . tSz.
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doned in England. Within a year or so after the decis-
ion in Babb v Reed the case of Fleinyng v Hector 9
was decided in the Court of Exchequer. It was held
that the members of a social club were not as such
liable for debts incurred by its management for work
done or goods supplied for the use of the club. Lord
Abinger, C. B., brushes aside the idea of such liability
as arising on the theory of a partnership relation by
distinguishing enterprises of the kind under consideration
from trading associations, which he says "stand on a
very different footing," and denies the power of any
member or fraction of the membership in the former
to pledge the personal credit of their fellows. Then in
1841 came the decision of the same court in Todd v
Emby,Io where the committee of a club had been sued
for supplies furnished on the order of the steward, who
from the evidence might be inferred to have been au-
thorized by the committee or some of its members to
order them. The claim that all the members of the com-
mittee were to be treated as partners, bound by the
authority given by some of them to the steward, was
again rejected as untenable, and the question declared
to be one of the liability of each individual member
on the ground of his specific assent to the contract.
Finally, in Re St. James' Club,", the matter was set at
rest by a sweeping declaration that the law, however
uncertain in the past, was then settled that social clubs
were not partnerships. Thus, so far as English author-
ity for Judge King's proposition is concerned, except as
it applies to associations for profit, there seems to have
been little left of the ancient rule even at the time when
Thomas v Ellmaker was decided, and practically noth-
ing a few years thereafter. Nor do the recent American
cases give it any greater support, though there is a per-
plexing echo of it here and there.
9 2 M. & W. 172.
'o 8 M. & W. 504.
17 2 DeG., M. & G. 383.
THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF-
Christy's App.," like Hess v Merts,", was the case of
a banking association; Witmer v. Schlatter2 4 of a trans-..
portation company; Hedge & Horn's Appeal is of an oil.
company; Rhoads v. Fitzpatrick,06 of ar association.
for dealing in coal; Davidson v Holden:,7 of a co-opera-
tive meat market,-all of them essentially business,
trading, commercial adventures. In such the elements
of a partnership and the intent to create the partner-
ship relation may perhaps be implied from the nature
of the enterprise and the exigencies ordinarily incident
to its operation. Whatever may have been the ancient'
usage of the terms - co-partnership and co-ownership
as virtually synonymous,'8 it is now too well settled
to justify discussion that mere co-ownership of property
does not constitute co-partnership. Yet there is much
good sense in the suggestion of the editors' note in IS
Pepper & Lewis's Digest,'9 that co-proprietorship in
business may furnish evidence of an intent to assume
the partriership relation which even an express stipu-
lation to the contrary could not override. In a legal
sense the decisive "intent" is always to be sought, not
in the purpose of the actor undisclosed or, it may be
added, formally protested,' ° but in his purpose reason-
ably implied and manifested by his outward and vis-
ible act.2 ' The distinction above indicated between
business and other associations is emphasized in Mc-
Mahon v Rauhr," where a voluntary association for
"innocent pleasure, and not trade, business adventure
or profit" is held "not strictly a .co-partnership;"
". 92 Pa. X57.
23 4 S. & R. 356.
f4 2 R. 359.
Is 63 Pa. 273.
z6 z66 Pa. 294-
7 SS Conn. 103.
:8 See x Lindley, Part. p.*a.
19 Col. 25711..
,o See Brunswick, etc., Co. v. Hoover, 95 Pa. S08, S13; Ask v. G4&
97 id. 493, 499.
"See Bank v. North, z6o Pa. 303, 308.
S47 N. G. 67.
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though it is added that the rights of the associates in
the property and the modes of enforcing them are not
materially different from those of partners in the part-
nership property,--citing Lord Eldon's decision in the
old leading case of Beaumont v Meredith.23 In the later
case of Lafond v DeeMs,24 however, it is squarely ruled
that an association not for business, trade or profit,
but for the benefit and protection of its members, is
"certainly not a partnership." Similarly in Ask v
Guiess a Masonic lodge, unincorporated, whose pur-
poses were social, benevolent and charitable within
its membership, was held not to constitute a partner-
ship. The same conclusion was reached in Pain v
Sample 26 concerning a G. A. P. post and a committee
appointed by it to manage a series of entertainments
for its benefit, and in Burt v Lathrop,27 with reference
to an association of persons for the purpose of legal
resistance to the claims of a patentee. From these
decisions it is possible, of course, to differentiate those
denying the partnership character to associations of a
quasi-public nature in Thomas v Ellmaker 2S (a fire com-
pany), Volger v Ray 2 ("New England Pigeon and
Bantam Society"), Devoss v Gray so (a religious associa-
tion), McCabe v Goodfellows3 (a "Law and Order
League"), and kindred cases. But aside from these,
the weight of authority surely inclines to the view that
in associations not for trade or commerce the existence
of public objects, as distinguished from objects of benev-
olence, socialibility, pleasure, improvement or protec-
tion confined to the membership, is not indispensable.
to forbid the application of doctrines peculiar to the
23 3 Ves. & Beames i8o.
24 8z N. Y. 5o7.
's 97 Pa. 493.
,6 z$8 Pa. 428.
s? 52 Mich. zo6.
2S z Pars. Eq. (Pa.) 98.
29 131 Mass. 439.
30 22 Ohio St. zS9.
3, z33 N. Y. 89.
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law of partnership. To that extent, at any rate, the
ancient rule must be deemed to be modified by the
modem one; the latter being understood as conceding
partnership attributes, if at all, only to business associa-
tions. In such, where regarded as partnerships, the
problem of the liability of members inter se and to out-
siders present no questions which do not find their
adequate solution in the general principles of partner-
ship. In associations which are not partnerships those
questions must obviously be approached upon different,
lines. As to them the rule laid down by the Lord
Chancellor in Re St..James's Clubsl is fundamental; Viz.,
that "no member . . is liable . . except so
far as he has assented to the contract in respect of which
such liability has arisen, "-that rule determining his lia-
bility or non-liability both to his fellows and to outsiders
in the absence of special and necessarily exceptional
circumstances.
The effect of this rule is manifest. Whenever a mem-
ber not directly participating in the making of the con-
tract is to be visited with responsibility for a debt or
an expenditure incurred beyond the resources of the
association by its managers or by a fraction of its mem-
bership in its behalf, the question is one of agency on
the part of those incurring the debt or expenditure.
This agency, however, is a very different thing from that
which is said to exist in every member of a partnership
because of the partnership relation. The Civil law
sees in a partnership an artificial personality, a juristic
entity apart from its constituent members.s3 Our law
has come to the same conception of it.s4 Upon that doc-
trine, indeed, hangs the rule devoting firm assets pri-
marily to firm liabilities s as well as a lot of other
more or less familiar propositions. 6 It is no less essen-
3* 2 DeG., M. & G. 383, at p. 387.
s Howe, Stud. in Rom. Law, pp. 159 et seqq.
34 Donnally v. Ryan, 41 Pa. 301, 310; McNaughton's App., zoi,id.
550, 554; Boyd v. Cox, 153 id. 78, 82.
s Forsythe v. Woods, zx Wall. (U. S.), 484, 486.
36 See Smith v. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 319, 322.
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tial to a comprehension of what is meant when it is said
that every partner is clothed, with respect to the
partnership affairs, with a general agency to bind his
associates. In Pooky v Driver3? Sir George Jessel,
M. R., with his accustomed directness and lucidity
shows that the notion of a partner's agency (a term
whose use he deplores as confusing) cannot be under-
stood without grasping the notion of the existence of
the firm as an entity separate from that of the part-
ners. "But," says he, "when you get that idea clearly,
you will see at once what sort of agency it is. It is the
one person acting on behalf of the firm. He does not
act as agent, in the ordinary sense of the word, for the
others so as to bind the others; he acts on behalf of the
firm of which they are members; and as he binds the
firm and acts on the part of the firm, he is properly
treated as the agent of the firm. If you cannot grasp
the notion of a separate entity of the firm, then you
are reduced to this, that inasmuch as he acts partly for
himself and partly for the others, to the extent that he
acts for the others he must be an agent, and in that way
you get him to be an agent for the other partners, but
only in that way, because you insist upon ignoring the
existence of the firm as a separate entity. That being so
you do not help yourself in the slightest degree in arriv-
ing at a conclusion by stating that he must be an agent
for the others. It is only stating in other words that he
must be a partner, inasmuch as every partnership
involves this kind of agency; or, if you state that he is
agent for the others, you state that he is a partner."
As said by Mr. Justice Williams in Boyd v Thompson
& Coxe,38 the firm is "necessarily represented by the
natural persons who compose it." In short, the firm is
an artificial entity represented by each member by
virtue of his membership,-bound by the acts of those
thus representing it,-and in turn imposing liability
upon every member by reason of the obligation result-
37 L. R. S Ch. Div. 458, at p. 476.
39 Ubi supra.
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ing to the firm from the act of its representative. That
sort of representation may be and generally is termed
an agency. But accurately. speaking it is an agency,
not for the individuals composing the. firm, as natural
persons, but an agency for the partnership as a quasi-
juridical entity. Where there is no partnership there
can be no talk of such an agency. The agency capable
of affecting members of an association which is not a
partnership must obviously be what Sir George Jessel
calls an agency "in the ordinary sense of the word for
the others so as to bind the others,"-a power to act
for the particular individual intended to be held, rest-
ing in antecedent authorization or subsequent ratifica-
tion brought home to that individual.
An antecedent authorization may be express, and
in that event there is little room for trouble. Or it may
be implied. Possibly the liability of members even of
business associations would in all the cases in which
it has been affirmed be more logically referred to an
implied antecedent authorization than to any theory of
partnership. Datidson v Holden 39 seems to be put
upon that ground. So is Sproat v Porter,40 where per-
sons associated together for the purpose of obtaining a
charter as a banking company were held impliedly to
authorize expenditures, etc., needfully incurred therefor.
But in associations which do not fall within any of
these categories the implication cannot, as in those which.
do, arise from the nature, purposes and necessities of
the enterprise. It was pointed out in Flemyng v Hec-
tor,42 mentioned in Ash v Guie,4, and emphasized in
McCabe v GoodfeloW,43 that in associations of the kind
there under discussion, as distinguished from business
enterprises, the scheme of operations contemplates-
the" defraying of all expenses out of funds provided by
39 5 CO$ 0 o.
409 Man -300.
4 2 & W. 172.
4397 Pa. 493.
43 133 N. Y. 89.
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subscriptions, dues, etc., and implies no authority in
any one, member or officer, to pledge without limit the
personal credit of the members. It goes without say-
ing that this scheme may be modified by explicit pro-
visions to the contrary or by the adoption of measures
in themselves inconsistent with and therefore to that
extent displacing it. But nothing of that sort being in
the way, common experience and observation, which
are the sources of legal presumptions,44 make the rule
stated broadly applicable to associations not for busi-
ness, trade or commerce. It follows that as to such as
a class it .may be declared that no general implied au-
thority exists in any individual member, in any frac-
tion. of the membership, in any officer or managing
committee 'to bind the remaining members for debts
incurred or for expenditures made on behalf of the
association beyond the fund provided for its purposes
by subscriptions, dues or other contemplated revenues.
Lord Abinger in Flemyng v Hector,4S very pertinently
remarks that, if those in charge of the enterprise find
that more money is required than has been provided,
it is their business to call the association together and
ask for further means.
The rule stated has an important bearing also upon
the question of subsequent ratification, which again
may he express or implied. If the presumed under-
standing on all hands is that the association is to be
managed within the funds provided and that there is no
implied power to exceed them, every member has a
right to believe that it is being so managed until he is
apprized of the contrary. 4s When therefore it becomes a
question whether this or that act or omission on the
part of a given member is to be treated as an implied
ratification of expenditures, etc., beyond the available
resources, the principle that therecan be no inference of
44 Iron Co. v. Tomb, 48 Pa. 387, 391; Kissik v. Huner, 184 id.
174, 179.
4s 2 M. & W. 172, at p. 183.
4s A party is entitled to act upon the presumption that another is
performing his duty: Bard v. Ry. Co., 199 Pa. 94. 98.
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ratification where the act set up as constituting it was
done in excusable ignorance of material facts4 6 is one
to be seriously reckoned with.
A few of the decisions pointing out the liability of
members of associations not of the business type may
be referred to as illustrating the application of the doc-
trine of implied agency and ratification.
Ridgely v Dobson 47 was an action brought against
certain members of a literary society to recover for books
furnished to it. The cause was tried as between plain-
tiff and one only of the defendants, the others not hav-
ing been served or having -suffered judgment by default.
There was evidence that defendant was a member of
.the society and secretary of the committee that had
authorized the purchase by one of its members. It was
held that if the jury so believed a verdict against him
would be justified on the ground that members of such
ant association are liable for goods supplied to it on the
order of its agent with their concurrence and appro-
bation.
Very similar is Heath v Goslin.8 .At a public meeting
called in the interest of a movement towards estab-
lishing a Normal School a committee was appointed -to
set the project on foot and assume complete. manage-
merit. Subscriptions were procured as a sort of guar-
anty fund. The committee proceeded to organize the
school and managed it for some years. During this
time the committee authorized its chairman to employ
plaintiff as teacher at an annual salary, and the latter,
being unpaid for part of the time, sued the members
of the committee. It was held that they., were liable.
The argument unsuccessfully advanced in Eichbaum v
Irons, that the committee was acting only as agent for
the public meeting at which it was appointed, and
which was therefore its principal and responsible for iS
contracts, was rejected on substantially the same ground
46 Tatney V. Tanney. 159 Pa. 277.
47 3 W; & S. xS.
45 So Mo. 310.
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as in that case. The subscribers on the other hand were
declared to be liable only for the amounts subscribed by
them.
In Ash v Guie 4, the decision was in favor of the de-
fendants; but Mr. Justice Trunkey s points out the
conditions under which, if shown by the proofs, it would
upon a retrial have to be otherwise. Says he: "The
proof fails to show that the officers or a committee, or
any number of the members, had a right to contract
debts . . . which would be valid against every
member from the mere fact that he was a member ...
But-t..hose who .engaged in the enterprise 5' are liable for
the debts they contmcted, ahd 'all are included in such
liability who assented to the undertaking, or subse-
quently ratified it. Those who participated in the
erection of the building, by voting for and advising it,
are bound the same as the committee who had it in
charge. And so with reference to borrowing money.
A member who subsequently approved the erection or
borrowing could be held on the ground of ratification
of the agent's acts." All this was quoted with approval
in the later case of Pain v Sample,5" where, moreover,
the principle was applied that members of an entertain-
ment committee. appointed by the association are not
liable to a suit as individuals when acting and under-
stood as acting for the association intended to be bound
and legally bound as their principal by the contract
made. Besides, the case was held to be within the Act
of 1876,s3 declaring that members of certain beneficial
organizations shall not be individually liable for debts
payable out of the treasury thereof.
Murray v WalkerS4 is altogether in line with the rule
49 97 Pa. 493.
so See p. Soo.
st The erection of a Masonic Temple.
s' IS3 Pa. 428. at p. 432.
ss Act. Apr. 28, 1876. P. L. S3.
54 83 Ia. 202.
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stated in the above extract from Judge Trunkey's
opinion. There was evidence to show that the defend-
ant had subscribed and contributed towards the. estab-
lishment of a fair association; that he had been its
vice-president; that he had acted as judge at its races;
that he had himself assisted in collecting money to pay
debts incurred in its behalf. It was held that there was
enough to warrant the jury in finding, not only that he
was a member, but that he had ratified the incurring of
debts for which he was sought to be held. It will be
noticed that in this conclusion, as well as in-the rule Wkid
down in Ash v Cuie, the element of knowledge of the
fact that the funds provided were being .exceeded was
not absent. In the one case the nature of the under-
taking .in question would naturally suggest it. In the
other the defendant indisputably knew that debts were
being contracted by the society's management.
Possibly in this connection ought to be mentioned
the decision already referred to in Hedge & Horn's
Appeal.ss The venture there involved was a business
venture. It was started by obtaining subscriptions for
"shares" at so and so much each, the total number
being -limited. The contest arose, in the form of a bill
in equity, between subscribers. The prayers were for
discovery of amounts paid in by each, of disbursements
made and of liabilities incurred in behalf of the associa-
tion,-for the appointment of a receiver,-for the
settlement of accounts between the various subscribers,
-and for payment of the sums to be found due
from them respectively. In short, the theory of the
proceeding was that all those subscribing constituted
a partnership. There had been a formal organization.
But a number of the defendants had taken no part in it
or in any of the subsequent doings. Of these the Supreme
Court declared that they were not to be held as partners.
"If the subscriber," says Agnew, J.,s6 "interpose -and
ss 63 Pa. 273.
s6 P. 27&
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act as a member, or director, or attend meetings, or
accept office, or otherwise give himself out as a member,
he will make himself liable." This statement may be
regarded as somewhat broad, though perhaps not quite
as much so as the assertion in Devoss v Gray s, that a
member, in order to be held for debts incurred, must in
some way have sanctioned or acquiesced in them. But
the language was used in a case dealing with a business
association and with reference to circumstances exclud-
ing liability even under so wide a definition. It was
.therefore quite precise enough for the purposes of the
decision. The latter is, however, highly instructive in its
adjudication of the exact status of persons who put their
names to subscription- papers as agreeing to contribute
to enterprises launched in that way. The underlying
principle, indeed, is old enough.s8 The subscription,
though followed with payments, does not make the
subscriber a member of anything. It is but the declara-
tion of an intent to become a member. As a contract it
is merely executory, becoming executed so as to estab-
lish the contemplated relation, whaetver that may be,
only by acts of participation in the affairs of the associa-
tion. It is therefore ordinarily up to that point revoc-
able. Thus in Fair Association v Greer s9 the subscrip-
tion was held unenforceable against a subscriber who
thereafter stood aloof, unless it appear that it was dis-
tinctly given with a view to incorporation or that others
became subscribers upon the faith of his subscription."
When, however, a liability to pay rests upon the sub-
scriber the right of action, as intimated in Hedge &
Horn's Appeal,61 is at law and in the association, regarded,
according to Singing Society v Turn-Verein, " as occupy-
sT 22 Ohio St. 1$9.
si See Phipps v. Joes, 2o Pa. 26o. -
s zx Pa. Super. Ct. zo3.
o See Academy v. Robinson, 3 7 Pa. 310.
6- P. 279.
do 163 Pa. 265, 268.
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ing for this and other purposes a position intermediate
between a corporation and a partnership.6
G. A. ENDLICH.
6s See this case, and Blair Council v. M. F. B. Ass',., r2 Pa. Super.
Ct. 29, 32, and Orbin v. Stevens, z3 id. $9! , 599, as to the form in which
an action at law or in equity in behalf of the association may be prop-
erly brought. In Fletcher v. Gawanese Tribe, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 193.
it was held that assumpsit could not be maintained by a member
against the society, eo nomine, or against all or some (representing
themselves and others interested) of the members associated wnder
the joint title. The association is described as, -whilst not a partner.
ship, yet "in the nature thereof;" a "quasi-partnership;" a"_=
corporation," having, "still some of the features of a pa4ersl . '
aVui wittbot a legal entity except "through and by " -,-i- be ,
'.-4dd the dontrbvetsy as one between quasi-partners;" S. ..; pcv
to'which no common-law process or judgment was adapted. -It to
interesting to compare with this decision those in HamW V. SXPr*et*
Coucil, -Mis" Pa, s7; Dckinson v. Ancient Order, etc., z59 id: .8;
Blait-Go iilv. M: F. B. Ais'f. 12 Pa. Super. Ct. in all of which
judgments in.just such'pro6dedings were affirmed. In some .of the
states the practice has been settled by statute. In Pennsylvania it
may be true tliat adhuc sub judice lis est. Of course, no difficulty of
this sort can arise where an outside party seeks to hold certain desig-
nated members on the ground of direct contract, agency or ratifi-
cation.
